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Great expectations: the job at the top and the people who do it 
Nicholas Allen 
 
At the time of his death, Anthony King was working on a long-planned book-length 
study of the British prime ministership. Provisionally entitled The Job at the Top, the 
volume would have examined the styles and records of Britain’s post-war premiers. It 
promised to be an incisive and authoritative treatment. Working in chronological 
order, King had already finished the book’s introduction, as well as the chapters 
dealing with Clement Attlee, Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden. He was 
nothing if not systematic. Illness prevented him from completing the chapters on 
Harold Macmillan and his successors through to David Cameron. While King’s 
friends and colleagues can guess at what he might have written, they can only be 
certain that he would have pulled no punches in his appraisals.1 
King thought and wrote a great deal about prime ministers and political 
leadership more generally. In this he was much influenced by his friendship with 
Richard Neustadt, the great scholar of the American presidency.2 But in contrast to the 
way in which single papers embodied King’s contribution to our understanding of 
‘government overload’, ‘executive-legislative relations’ and ‘career politicians’, his 
contribution to our understanding of the prime ministership was defined by a body of 
work. He wrote essays on a range of topics, from the comparative powers of British 
prime ministers, through Margaret Thatcher’s style as an ‘outsider’ leader, to the 
impact of leadership effects in British general elections, all of which expanded our 
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knowledge of prime ministerial and party leadership in Britain. There was, however, 
no single career-defining contribution. The whole of his thinking on the subject 
always exceeded the parts of his writings.  
King’s Canadian background and formative academic years as an historian 
imparted an acute awareness of the prime ministership’s comparative and historical 
context to his work. His writings also drew on a remarkable insight and understanding 
of real-world practice. King had met most of Britain’s post-war prime ministers and 
enjoyed access to the circles in which they moved. He liked to tell the story of the 
time when, in 1964, he and David Butler had visited Number 10 Downing Street to 
interview Sir Alec Douglas-Home for that year’s Nuffield election study. Both men 
soon realised that Sir Alec had set aside more time for the interview than they had 
prepared for. The two researchers did their best to improvise before the prime minister 
offered them a personal tour of the building. They gratefully accepted. Lastly, of 
course, King wrote about prime ministers in the same way he wrote about everything 
else: accessibly, brilliantly and clearly. Reading his work was always fun. 
This essay explores King’s contribution to the study of the British prime 
ministership. It first surveys the range of his writings and some of the themes that 
characterised his work. It then relates his work and thinking to claims about the 
‘presidentialisation’ of the office. Finally, the essay draws on his work to consider the 
importance of the expectations surrounding the office. As Britain grapples with the 
challenges associated with Brexit, we should all take note of his counsel against 
expecting too much in the way of ‘strong’ prime ministerial leadership. 
 
King on the prime ministership 
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Almost everyone who studied politics in a British university in the 1970s and 1980s 
would have been familiar with King’s The British Prime Minister. First published in 
1969, this edited volume sought to make accessible ‘the most important materials’ 
published over the previous decade, including academic work and interviews with 
practising politicians. It also served to highlight the surprising scholarly neglect of the 
office. ‘The Prime Minister is the most conspicuous figure in British political life; he 
is also, by all ordinary standards, the most powerful’, wrote King. And yet, ‘the 
academic literature on the Prime Ministership is thin.’3 The literature was sustained by 
little original research and characterised by a tendency to rehash the same old 
arguments and examples. King’s frustrations reflected his sympathy for post-war 
North American political science and its emphasis on developing theory and testing 
claims empirically. His frustrations were still evident in the mid-1980s when he 
produced the volume’s second edition: ‘All of the books on the prime ministership 
can easily be held in one hand’, he now observed: ‘the books on the prime 
ministership and the cabinet together can easily be held in two hands. The article 
literature is similarly meagre’.4  
In the three decades since King revised The British Prime Minister, the 
quantity and quality of the academic literature has improved somewhat. It is still thin 
when compared to the volume of research on the US presidency, but it would now be 
impossible to hold in two hands all the available books. The relevant article literature 
has also grown. Nearly 60 papers focusing principally on the prime ministership were 
published in just seven British political-science journals in the quarter-century 
between 1991 and 2016.5 The topics covered included the prime minister’s powers of 
appointment, their accountability to parliament, their roles in foreign-policy making, 
their temperament and psychological disposition, their media relations and profile, 
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their rhetoric, their institutional resources, their skills and style and even their overall 
success in office. Many more articles have been published in other general and more 
specialist journals.  
King’s own contribution to the literature generally fell into—and often 
straddled—one of three broad categories. In the first category were a number of 
essays that focused on the institution of the prime ministership. During the early 
1990s, for instance, King wrote about the conflicting principles that structured 
Britain’s political executive, how and when prime ministers impinged upon 
ministerial autonomy, and the power of British prime ministers compared with that of 
other ‘chief executives’ in Western Europe.6 The last of these essays argued that, 
when measured in terms of a head of government’s potential influence within her 
country’s governmental structures, the British prime minister was one of the most 
powerful. 
During the same period, King also wrote a survey article on the prime 
ministership for a special issue of West European Politics. It was probably the closest 
thing to a comprehensive statement of his interpretation of the office.7 In this piece, he 
identified what he considered to be the seven basic ‘requirements of the job’: 
appointing and dismissing ministers; appointing the most senior civil servants; 
chairing cabinet and important cabinet-committee meetings; answering questions in 
the House of Commons, and occasionally making statements; attending European 
Union and international heads-of-government meetings; acting as minister for the 
security services; and deciding on the timing of elections. The requirements of the job 
did not include, quite explicitly, general policy leadership. The same article also set 
out the principal sources of prime ministerial power, with a particular emphasis on the 
powers of appointment, dismissal and portfolio allocation. The rise in the number of 
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career politicians, King argued, had only increased the importance of these powers 
and, consequently, a prime minister’s potential influence over other politicians. 
The second category of King’s work included essays that focused on prime 
ministers as political operators. In a 2010 article, for example, he examined how 
different prime ministers had used their power of dismissal and found that Margaret 
Thatcher had been far more likely than others to sack ministers on ideological or 
policy grounds.8 Indeed, Thatcher’s style of leadership was a favourite subject of 
King’s. Most prime ministers took office without wishing to transform Britain; and 
insofar as they did, their policy goals and agenda were usually the same as those of 
their party. Thatcher was different. Moreover, Thatcher was distinctive in the extent to 
which she actually employed the office to advance her agenda. She used her powers 
of appointment to create a government more sympathetic to her programme, she 
worked remarkably long hours, and she dominated her colleagues, setting forth her 
views at the start of meetings and using the full force of her personality and intellect 
to argue her case. Lastly, Thatcher was successful, in that she largely achieved the 
extensive changes in policy that she sought.9 For all these reasons, she greatly affected 
how academics and other politicians viewed the possibilities of the premiership. 
It was the exceptional combination of Thatcher’s motivation, instrumental 
dominance and success that piqued King’s interest as a political scientist. To invoke 
Neustadt’s distinction, Thatcher was the embodiment of a ‘leader’—a chief executive 
who used her powers to advance her agenda—rather than a ‘clerk’—a performer of 
routine roles. No less exceptional was Thatcher’s ‘outsider’ style of leadership. 
Because of her Lincolnshire background, gender and convictions, she was both a 
social outsider in her party and the wider ‘establishment’, and a psychological 
outsider in her self-identification and orientation towards them. Above all, she was a 
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tactical outsider in her behaviour: she showed ‘comprehensive disdain for the norms, 
the conventions and the customary civilities of British political life.’10 She rejected 
consensus and traditional ideas of cabinet government, she often sought to undermine 
established institutions, and she was often rude to those she did not esteem. If 
Thatcher happened to be an interesting case-study of prime ministerial leadership, she 
was also a case-study in outsider leadership.11  
The third broad category of Kings’s work included essays that focused not so 
much on the job or those who did it, but on the getting of the job. Since being the 
leader of one of the major parties was a necessary if not sufficient condition for 
becoming prime minister, this third area of inquiry led King to consider the question 
of how and why parties selected their leaders. In the mid-1960s, for instance, he noted 
the different criteria seemingly applied in the election and selection respectively of 
Harold Wilson and Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Many Conservatives, he reckoned, were 
less affected less by calculations of ‘electoral expediency’ than their Labour 
counterparts.12 Crucially, however, intra-party considerations were to the fore. Most 
of the time, King later wrote, party members look ‘for the person who will lead the 
party best rather than the person who will lead the country best. The issue of who 
would make “the best prime minister” … scarcely arises.’13 
In the early 1990s King turned to another aspect of the getting of the job, this 
time the question of whether prime ministers’ and party leaders’ personalities, or, 
more precisely, their images, directly influenced election outcomes. Working with 
Ivor Crewe, King followed an essentially counter-factual line of inquiry: how would 
parties’ vote shares have changed had the two major parties’ leaders been switched at 
successive elections?14 Their analysis, which drew on available individual-level 
survey data and came with plenty of health warnings, suggested that only in the close 
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races of 1964 and February 1974 had the personal appeal of the party leaders had a 
decisive impact on the result. In both cases, it was Wilson’s relative popularity over 
Douglas-Home and Edward Heath respectively that gave Labour victory. This was not 
to say that leaders’ images did not influence vote choice, only that they rarely 
determined the outcome. 
 
Common threads 
If the body of King’s work on prime ministers can be divided into one of three 
categories, it can also be united by a number of themes. The first of these was his 
unvarnished analytical concern with what Richard Neustadt might have termed the 
prime minister’s ‘vantage points’, those powers and resources that underpinned his or 
her power within government, and how prime ministers exploited them. King was 
largely unimpressed by the constitutional façade and niceties of the office; his 
preoccupation was always with what he considered to be the essential architecture of 
intra-governmental power. It was largely for this reason that whereas Peter Hennessy 
identified no fewer than 36 prime ministerial functions in 2000, including those such 
as managing relations with the monarch and authorising the use of nuclear weapons, 
King highlighted just seven basic ‘requirements of the job’ (see above).15 For similar 
reasons, King’s work frequently emphasised the party dimension of the job: ‘To an 
extent that is sometimes overlooked by outsiders, the prime ministership is a party job 
before it is a governmental or national job … no one can become [or remain] prime 
minister in Britain without the support of his or her party.’16 Explaining and 
understanding power in government required a sharp awareness of what was 
occurring outside of government. 
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A second theme that united King’s work was his emphasis on the great 
variability associated with the office. This variability was, if you like, the great 
constant. Different prime ministers had always brought different experiences, skills, 
priorities and personalities to the job, operated in very different contexts and adopted 
very different styles. They had also varied greatly in their personal standing within 
government. Rephrasing H.H. Asquith’s famous aphorism, King suggested that: ‘The 
power of the prime minister is what a prime minister wants, and is able, to get away 
with’.17 Needless to say, what a prime minister wanted and could get away with 
varied across and within premierships. Thus Margaret Thatcher was a more dominant 
prime minister than Clement Attlee, while her own dominance fell away sharply at the 
end. What a prime minister wanted and could get away with also varied from minister 
to minister. Just as some prime ministers were more dominant than others, so some 
ministers, especially the so-called ‘big beasts of the jungle’, were more resilient to 
prime ministerial dominance. Prime ministers, historically, had granted considerable 
autonomy to such individuals. They risked trouble when they disregarded or 
mismanaged them.18 
A third and related theme in King’s work was his consistent promotion of the 
need to study the variability that characterised the office. When he first began writing 
on the subject, the academic literature was dominated by a debate over two static 
models and whether Britain’s executive resembled prime ministerial or cabinet 
government. It would have been more fruitful, argued King, to have focused on 
collecting data, identifying patterns of behaviour and testing claims. Since then, 
variability has become a central preoccupation of much conceptual and empirical 
work, although debates around static models still exert some sway, as we shall see in 
the next section.19 
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A final theme that characterised King’s work was his interest in the big 
picture. Researchers, he thought, should generally be able to answer the ‘so what?’ 
question. Thus, in one sense, and reflecting Neustadt’s influence, he was interested in 
the scope for prime ministerial leadership. In another sense, he was interested not so 
much in whether leaders’ images influenced vote choice but in whether they had a 
decisive impact on election outcomes. In yet another sense, and reflecting a concern 
that characterised all his academic work, King was interested in how prime ministerial 
behaviour affected the quality of government. In the 1960s, for example, he had first 
drawn attention to the potentially harmful administrative and policy consequences of 
frequent cabinet reshuffles.20 Much later, in The Blunders of Our Governments, King, 
again with Ivor Crewe, made the same point. They also considered the comparatively 
small size of the prime minister’s office and the role it had played in policy failures. 
Some blunders had occurred in part because the prime minister of the day had lacked 
the clout to coordinate policy and ensure decisions were implemented.21 They 
concluded that some additional capacity was probably needed to improve policy 
coordination from the centre.  
 
The presidentialisation thesis 
To repeat a point made in the introduction, King’s contribution to our understanding 
and knowledge of the prime ministership was defined by a body of work rather than 
any single study. His writings advanced our knowledge, in general terms, about the 
office and its occupants. They also contributed to broader debates about the character 
of British government and especially the pitfalls of becoming fixated by static models 
of government. This last point has an obvious resonance with claims of 
‘presidentialisation’ in British government, in particular the notion that prime 
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ministers increasingly resemble presidents—and usually presidents of the United 
States—in their style and power. This notion colours a great deal of contemporary 
political discourse and media commentary, usually in the context of criticising 
excessive power in Downing Street. 
There is, of course, nothing new in likening the prime minister to a president. 
As the journalist Sidney Low observed as long ago as 1904, 
 
The office of Premier has become more than ever like that of an elective 
President, since it has been held by a succession of able statesmen, who were 
unquestionably the real, as well as the nominal, chiefs of their parties, and 
generally stood far above all rivalry or competition on their own side.22 
 
The comparison was given further impetus by Richard Crossman in the 1960s when 
he drew attention to the apparent marginalisation of cabinet and parliament and the 
centralisation of policy making in and around Downing Street. Such claims were 
dismissed by Crossman’s boss, Harold Wilson, and countered in the academic 
literature by George Jones.23 Yet claims of presidentialisation never went away. They 
were reinvigorated by Margaret Thatcher’s distinctive style of leadership, and 
turbocharged by Tony Blair’s. 
Among academics, the notion of presidentialisation has been given its fullest 
conceptual airing by Michael Foley and by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb.24 For 
Foley, the value of the term lies in drawing attention to how recent British prime 
ministers, notably Thatcher and Blair, have tried to lead by distancing themselves 
from other institutions, in a way that US presidents are constitutionally and often 
politically obliged to. Poguntke and Webb, meanwhile, highlight how the term 
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encapsulates three seemingly related trends in many established democracies: the 
accretion of leadership power resources and autonomy within the political executive; 
the same accretion within political parties; and increasingly personalised media 
coverage and electoral processes. Related to and potentially reinforcing these trends 
are deep-rooted changes in the character of electorates: class and partisan dealignment 
and declining levels of political engagement have arguably increased the importance 
of short-term leader evaluations in driving individual vote choice.25 
King accepted that the institutional resources at a prime minister’s disposal 
had grown in recent years but was sceptical that they amounted to a serious empire. 
He also recognised that elections and media coverage had become more personalised, 
and that leaders sometimes distanced themselves from their parties. Yet, in the first 
instance, there was no evidence that leaders’ images were increasingly determining 
election outcomes over other factors; and, in the second, Thatcher’s and Blair’s 
outsider leadership had earlier precedents.  
King robustly challenged the presidentialisation thesis in his 2007 book The 
British Constitution, dismissing the idea that the prime ministership had become a 
‘super presidency … endowed with plenipotentiary and almost preternatural 
powers’.26 Rather, the office was simply what it had been for a long time: the 
headship of government in a parliamentary system that, given the right circumstances, 
was capable of sustaining dominant leaders. For King, claims to the contrary rested on 
‘bad geometry’ and a poor sense of history. It was not the case that prime ministers 
had become consistently more dominant within their own governments. There was no 
such straight line. There had always been dominant prime ministers, and there had 
always been weaker prime ministers. John Major followed Margaret Thatcher, just as 
Lord Rosebery had followed William Gladstone a century earlier. 
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King also rejected the related the claim that the personalisation of politics had 
somehow given prime ministers greater celebrity. Celebrity had always been 
associated with Downing Street. No one, for instance, could doubt the contemporary 
strength of Gladstone’s image. Nor was celebrity a necessary or sufficient condition 
for prime ministerial dominance. Edward Heath, perhaps consistently the most 
dominant head of a British government since 1945, was hardly the archetypal 
celebrity. Blair, who was the archetypal prime ministerial celebrity of recent times, 
was only partially dominant thanks to the brooding presence of Gordon Brown. 
Moreover, being the focus of media attention was a double-edged sword. If it 
empowered prime ministers when things were going well, it made them more 
vulnerable when things went badly. 
King’s rejection of presidentialisation had much to do with an enduring 
commitment to conceptual and analytical clarity. As Keith Dowding has convincingly 
argued, the notion of presidentialisation does little to promote either.27 It is a media-
friendly term, to be sure, but masks conceptually and analytically distinct processes of 
personalisation and policy centralisation, both of which play out in different ways in 
parliamentary and presidential systems. Moreover, as King alluded to in his own 
work, many commentators and politicians tend to invoke presidentialisation both to 
describe and explain prime ministerial dominance. In doing so, they conflate the 
dependent variable—an alleged increase in the prime minister’s potential influence—
with the independent variables—the factors that allegedly explain it—specifically the 
prime minister’s celebrity and their slightly expanded resources. 
That said, while King rejected the notion of presidentisalisaion as an accurate 
or useful analytical framework, he recognised that its prominence in contemporary 
discourse could potentially shape the mindset and behaviour of politicians. With New 
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Labour very much in mind, King considered the circumstances in which party 
politicians might expect a prime minister to be dominant: 
 
It is just conceivable that the members of an administration, especially the 
members of an incoming administration, with few ministers who had 
previously served in government, might actually want the prime minister to be 
dominant. Alternatively they might have come to believe that dominant 
premiers were, as a matter of fact, the norm, and on that basis they might well 
have come to regard prime ministerial dominance as normal and, therefore, as 
acceptable.28 
 
King thought that such circumstances were likely to be rare and transient, however, 
since ministers would soon find their feet and develop their own power base within 
government. Nevertheless, expectations mattered; and expectations could potentially 
be shaped by others’ belief in presidentialisation. 
 
Overloaded expectations? 
King’s point about the importance of expectations brings us to the final part of this 
essay: the nature of contemporary expectations surrounding the prime ministership. 
There can be little doubt that many voters, journalists and politicians expect a great 
deal from British prime ministers—and, since they are potential prime ministers, from 
party leaders. Many people seemingly expect prime ministers to provide a clear sense 
of policy direction. They expect prime ministers to manage and dominate their 
colleagues. They expect prime ministers to respond to all emergencies and resolve all 
problems. They expect prime ministers to take the decisions. In short, many people 
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expect them to be strong leaders. For Archie Brown, the ‘myth of the strong leader’ 
and the widely-held view that such leaders are to be preferred to those who operate 
differently, has become all pervasive in contemporary democratic politics.29   
At this point, two notes of caution should be sounded. The first is that claims 
about expectations of strong prime ministerial leadership should not be exaggerated in 
either its extent or novelty. The buck has long stopped with prime ministers, and 
people have always looked to them to provide a lead. Second, there is very little direct 
evidence of what different groups of people expect or want from the prime minister, 
and thus how it has changed. There is little survey evidence that might reveal how 
voters’ expectations have changed or compare to those in other countries. There is 
similarly little evidence that might be used to establish whether MPs, party activists 
and voters have systematically different expectations. Nevertheless, there seems little 
doubt that the expectations surrounding today’s prime ministers are somewhat greater 
than those of a century ago, just as the expectations surrounding other heads of 
government are generally greater. 
One feature of the British political system that seems to encourage great 
expectations, or at least does nothing to dampen them, is the absence of any single 
authoritative document that sets out the prime minister’s role, responsibilities and 
powers in government. The office is referenced in statute—in no fewer than 100 items 
of primary UK legislation from the Chequers Estate Act 1917 to the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017—but there is no comprehensive legal 
definition.30  The closest thing to an official statement of the prime minister’s role and 
powers, The Cabinet Manual, merely describes the existing vague state of affairs i.e. 
that the prime minister determines and regulates the membership and procedures of 
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cabinet, which is the ultimate decision-making body of government.31 The scope for 
more or less dominant leadership is correspondingly huge. 
If the foundations of the office do little to discourage expectations of strong 
leadership, then other features of the system may positively encourage it. Most of 
these have been around for a long time. The institution of ‘prime ministers questions’, 
for example, assumed its modern form in 1961 and has since evolved to oblige prime 
ministers—and leaders of the opposition—regularly to show mastery over potentially 
any area of public policy under the full scrutiny of MPs, journalists and any member 
of the public who might be watching. The practice brought into sharp focus the prime 
minister’s ultimate political responsibility for everything that goes wrong in 
government, and, as King noted, reinforced his or her ‘open licence to enquire, to 
intervene, to goad, to check, to prod, to remonstrate, even to dominate’.32  
Another institutional requirement of the job that almost certainly reinforces the 
expectation of strong leadership is the need to meet regularly with other heads of 
government. Even during the early post-war period, such meetings were rare. From 
the early 1970s, however, the demands of regular European Union heads-of-
government meetings, coupled with the advent of faster, safer travel, has resulted in 
prime ministers spending a far greater proportion of their time meeting with other 
leaders. They now act as their government’s representative; and they share in the aura 
of being surrounded by other heads of government. Prime ministers may or may not 
have been empowered by the subsequent coupling of domestic and international 
concerns, but this development has almost certainly reinforced an expectation on the 
home front that the prime minister could and should lead on potentially issue.33  
Meanwhile, changes in the ways that prime ministers get the job have also 
probably exacerbated an expectation of strong leadership. Both the Labour and 
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Conservative parties have, since the early 1980s, opened up their leadership-election 
rules so as to enable the participation of rank-and-file members. Party leaders 
consequently have the added personal authority that comes with the direct backing of 
tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of party members. Labour leader 
Jeremy Corbyn invoked this fact when three-quarters of his own MPs expressed no 
confidence in his leadership in the wake of the 2016 Brexit referendum. He simply 
faced them down. If presidentialisation—in the narrow sense of enhanced personal 
authority—has any relevance to the modern prime ministership, it is surely as a 
consequence of the personal mandate they may now enjoy within their own party. It 
would be remarkable if they and their ministerial colleagues were not mindful of this 
mandate in their interactions.  
A final feature worth highlighting is the personalisation of general election 
campaigns. Party leaders are encouraged to demonstrate their brains and ability at 
every turn. The arrival of televised leaders’ debates has also probably led voters and 
others to link parties’ pledges personally to their leaders. At any rate, such innovations 
are unlikely to have dampened the broader climate of expectations in any way. They 
have probably helped to ratchet them up.  
If some features of the system help to reinforce a demand for strong 
leadership, it is clear is that those expecting prime ministers to be consistently 
dominant are likely to be hugely disappointed. In the British system, executive 
authority remains fundamentally vested in cabinet, collectively, and secretaries of 
state, individually. Even if prime ministers were endowed with superhuman 
intelligence and ability, they would still lack the powers and resources to dominate. 
As King noted in his 2015 book, Who Governs Britain?, it is ‘easy to overestimate the 
importance of the prime minister in the British system of government’.34 All prime 
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ministers are hugely constrained, and always have been, by their limited personal staff 
and limited time, the legal pre-eminence of cabinet, the presence of colleagues with 
responsibilities and authorities of their own, and the myriad demands on their time 
emanating from elsewhere. If it is easy to overestimate the prime minister’s 
importance, it likely that many people do. 
The general consequences of expecting too much are all too clear. First, like 
all unrealistic expectations, they are likely to be a source of disappointment. Second, 
trying to meet expectations may to lead to behaviour that is dysfunctional. The logic 
and rules of British government are not designed around a single strong chief 
executive. There is no large personal staff to advise prime ministers, coordinate policy 
and ensure decisions are implemented. Moreover, if prime ministers try to concentrate 
decision making in their hands, they may increase the incidence of delayed decisions 
and potentially flawed decisions. Third, trying to meet expectations may make prime 
ministers politically vulnerable. If they seek to dominate colleagues by, for instance, 
rebuking or mocking them in public, or by being rude in private, they will create 
enemies who may be more minded to strike if things go awry. 
In his last published article, King looked at the relationship between ‘strong’ 
and ‘successful’ executive leadership, and concluded that the relationship in Britain 
was ‘tenuous and may even, possibly, be negative’.35 He wrote these words before 
Theresa May succeeded David Cameron as Conservative leader and prime minister in 
2016. Needless to say, May’s example constitutes another case in support of the 
negative association. Coming to office in the wake of the Brexit referendum and 
facing the monumentally difficult task of leading Britain’s withdrawal from the 
European Union, the new prime minister imported from the Home Office her closed, 
controlling and—in the words of Kenneth Clarke—‘bloody difficult’ style of 
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leadership. In the process, she alienated many in her party and showed little 
inclination to build a broad consensus around what form Britain’s post-Brexit 
relationship with the EU should take. Moreover, her promise of ‘strong and stable’ 
leadership backfired enormously during the 2017 general election. She was 
demonstrably neither. When her authority evaporated with her party’s overall 
majority, any idea of prime ministerial dominance flew out the window. 
On rare occasions, as King acknowledged, strong leadership may well be 
needed. May and her advisers seemingly reckoned that the highly unusual 
circumstances of Brexit were such an occasion. Had the 2017 general election given 
the Tories a large majority, her approach and style might have paid off. Yet, even 
then, the assertion of strong leadership in the context of negotiating Britain’s 
withdrawal from the EU would still have been risky. Given the complexity and 
divisiveness of the task, and the likelihood that something would go wrong at some 
point, her own power stakes would arguably have been better protected with a more 
collegial approach from the outset. For the country as a whole, a more inclusive style 
might have produced a better negotiating strategy and increased the likelihood of a 
better final deal. 
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